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Abstract
We present evidence against the standard assumptions that social preferences are stable
and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner. Researchers often measure social
preferences by posing dictator type allocation decisions. The Social Value Orientation
(SVO) is a particular sequence of dictator decisions. We vary the order in which the SVO
and a larger stakes dictator game are presented. In our rst study, we nd that prosocial
subjects act even more prosocially when the SVO is administered rst, whereas selsh
subjects are una¤ected by the order. We also nd that, among subjects with consistent
responses on the SVO measure, the subjects who rst receive the SVO are more generous
in the dictator game than are such subjects who receive the SVO last. In our second study,
we vary the order of the SVO and a nonstandard dictator game. We nd evidence across all
subjects that those who rst receive the SVO are more generous in the dictator game but
we do not nd the e¤ect among only the generous subjects. We again nd that subjects
with a perfectly consistent SVO measure are more generous when the SVO is given rst.
Although we cannot determine whether the timing a¤ects preferences or the measure of
preferences, our results are incompatible with the assumptions that social preferences are
stable and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly assumed that subjects have stable preferences over outcomes. It is also com-
monly assumed that standard techniques to measure these preferences are reliable and can be
performed in a nonintrusive manner. If these two assumptions hold then the order in which
we perform the measurement of preferences should not matter. However, we present evidence
which challenges these assumptions.
It is signicant if a systematic violation of these assumptions is found. Measures of pref-
erences are of interest primarily because they are helpful in making predictions regarding
behavior. However, if the outcome of a measurement can a¤ect future outcomes, either be-
cause preferences are not stable or because the measure is not reliable, then the value of the
measure is diminished.
In order to investigate whether the timing of the measurement can a¤ect the outcome of
the measures, we o¤er an extremely simple experimental setup: we o¤er subjects two standard
measures but vary the order of their presentation. One might be tempted investigate these
timing issues with a measure of social preferences and play in a strategic game (for instance,
the prisoners dilemma). However, if the experimenter observed that the relationship between
the measure and behavior in the game is a¤ected by the order in which the items are given,
this di¤erence is not exclusively attributable to the timing of the measure. This is because
behavior in a strategic game is not exclusively a function of preferences but also, for instance,
expectations regarding the behavior of others. Therefore, rather than directing subjects to
play a strategic game, we o¤er two commonly-used measures of social preferences, and vary
the order in which they are presented to the subjects. By doing this, we are condent that
the e¤ects which we nd are not due to the more complicated features involved in the play of
a strategic game.
It has been known for some time that many subjects do not simply maximize their own
material payo¤s.1 Specically, it is often observed that some subjects will sacrice their own
material payo¤s so that other subjects will receive a better material outcome. Researchers
1For an early example, see Deutsch (1958).
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often attempt to infer the nature of these social preferences by posing a series of allocation
decisions, often referred to as dictator games. These decisions entail a choice of an allocation of
hypothetical or material outcomes distributed between the subject and another subject. One
measurement technique is to simply pose a dictator game to a subject. Another measurement
technique, which involves a specic sequence of dictator games, is Social Value Orientation
(SVO).
In our experiment, we vary the order of the SVO and a standard, lager stakes dictator
game.2 While we nd that SVO outcomes are signicantly related to outcomes in the dictator
game, we also nd that the mappings between these outcomes are related to the order in
which they are given. Specically, we nd that the subjects, for whom the SVO indicates
prosocial preferences, act even more prosocially in the larger stakes dictator game when the
SVO is administered rst. By contrast, we nd that the subjects for whom SVO indicates
selsh preferences are una¤ected by the order. We also nd that subjects with a perfectly
consistent SVO measure are more generous in the dictator game when they are rst given the
SVO measure.
To better understand these results we run an identical experiment, with the exception
that the dictator game exhibits a relative price of each allocation of 1-to-3, rather than the
standard 1-to-1. In other words, each $0.50 kept by the subject reduces the recipients payo¤s
by $1.50. In this case, we nd no signicant di¤erence between the prosocials who complete
the SVO before the dictator game and the prosocials who complete the SVO after the dictator
game. However, across all subjects we nd that those who rst complete the SVO are more
generous in the dictator game than subjects who complete the SVO last. Further, we nd
that this e¤ect is stronger when we restrict attention to those with a perfectly consistent SVO
measure.
Given the results of our experiment, we are unable to distinguish between the explanation
that the measurement a¤ects the social preferences of the subject or that the measure a¤ects
the subsequent performance of another measure. Although we cannot distinguish between
2For more on dictator games, see Forsythe et al. (1994), Ho¤man et al. (1994), Eckel and Grossman (1996),
Ru­ e (1998) and Bolton et al. (1998).
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these two explanations, we can conclude that, given the assumptions commonly applied to
experiments, we should not observe the behavior found in this experiment. The results of
our experiment suggest that standard techniques of measuring social preferences cannot be
executed in a reliable and nonintrusive manner. Further, as we have uncovered a systematic
relationship between the treatment, the action of the subjects and the measure, we therefore
describe our results as endogenous rather than unstable.
1.1 Social Value Orientation as a Measure of Social Preferences
We use SVO because it is relatively easy to administer and interpret. The specic technique
which we use, adapted from Van Lange et al. (1997), consists of 9 items with three possible
choices involving material payo¤s accruing to the subject and another subject.3 Each of the
nine items has an individualistic response, a prosocial response and a competitive response.
The individualistic response is the one in which the material payo¤s accruing to oneself are
the largest. In other words, selecting the individualistic choice suggests that the subject
neither positively nor negatively values the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
The prosocial response is the one in which the sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both
the subject and the other subject is the largest. In other words, selecting the prosocial response
suggests that the subject positively values the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
The competitive response is the one in which the di¤erence between the material payo¤s
accruing to the subject and the other subject is the largest. In other words, selecting the
competitive choice suggests that the subject negatively values the material payo¤s accruing
to the other subject.
Translated into a utility function, SVO measures the form of u(xown; xother) where xown
is the material payo¤ accruing to self and xother is the material payo¤ accruing to another
person. A prosocial choice indicates that @u@xother > 0, an individualistic choice suggests that
@u
@xother
= 0 and a competitive choice suggests that @u@xother < 0.
Further, there is much written on the stability of SVO. For instance, Bogaert et al. (2008)
suggest that over the 40 years since its introduction by Messick and McClintock (1968), SVO
3See the appendix for a complete description of the SVO items which we use.
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has been widely regarded as providing a stable measure of a personality trait. However, recent
work has suggested instances where SVO can be a¤ected by the setting and is thereby a less
than perfectly stable measure. Iedema and Poppe (1994) show that the measurement of SVO
can be a¤ected by self-presentation e¤ects. Smeesters et al. (2003) show that priming certain
types of behavior can lead to a di¤erent mapping from SVO to behavior.4 While SVO is
considered relatively stable, to our knowledge there is no work suggesting that outcomes of
SVO can a¤ect subsequent outcomes.
It is obviously problematic that the timing of the measurement of preferences might a¤ect
the relationship between the measure and behavior related to the measure. A measure is
primarily useful to the extent that it can form a basis for making predictions about behavior.5
When behavior and the measure of preferences are functions not exclusively of preferences
then the usefulness of the measure is somewhat degraded.
SVO also appears in the economics literature.6 However each of these papers uses the
ring measure (Griesinger and Livingston, 1973), which is slightly di¤erent than the technique
which we employ. The ring measure consists of 24 pair-wise items rather than 9 items with
3 responses.7 However, similar to the technique which we employ, the ultimate objective is
to classify subjects on the basis of their social preferences. Relatively little is known about
the relationship between the ring measure and the measure which we employ (Bogaert et al.,
2008). However, we opt for the latter as it requires fewer responses and, in our opinion, is
more transparent. As a result, we conjecture that the e¤ects which we nd would only be
strengthened by the use of the ring measure.
Finally, measuring social preferences via dictator games, like SVO, has the advantage that
it only considers a situation where strategic issues are absent. Although all decisions would be
made in the absence of the feedback of the actions of other dictators, it still remains possible
4Also see Au and Kwong (2004) and Hertel and Fiedler (1994, 1998).
5SVO has been used to study behavior in games (Parks, 1994; Kramer et al., 1986; Pruyn and Riezehos,
2001), the decision to use public transportation (Van Vugt et al., 1996), proenvironmental behavior (Cameron
et al., 1998; Joireman et al., 2001) and volunteerism (McClintock and Allison, 1989).
6See Buckley et al. (2001), Buckley et al. (2003), Burlando and Guala (2005), Carpenter (2003), Carpenter
(2005), Cornelissen et al. (2007), Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) and O¤erman et al. (1996).
7Sonnemans et al. (2006) uses a visual representation of the ring whereby the subject selects their location
on the ring with a single click rather than responding to 24 items.
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that the subject would anticipate some implicit reciprocal arrangement. Therefore, similar
to Carpenter (2005), we employ a triadic design whereby each dictator decides an allocation
involving self and another dictator. This other dictator does not decide on an allocation
involving the original dictator but rather on a third dictator.
1.2 Other Measures of Social Preferences
Another commonly used social preference measurement technique was developed by Andreoni
and Miller (2002). SVO is similar to this technique in that both pose a series of dictator
games however there remain important di¤erences. In Andreoni and Miller, choice is much
less restricted than in SVO. Each SVO item has only three possible responses, whereas in
Andreoni and Miller each item seeks an allocation of tokens ranging from 40 to 100. As a
result, Andreoni and Miller yields less coarse data than does SVO. However, the choice in
Andreoni and Miller is less transparent than SVO, as the latter explicitly lists the material
allocation of each choice. We are not aware of a study which compares the relative merits of
SVO and that proposed by Andreoni and Miller.
Charness and Rabin (2002) pose a series of simple games to learn the specic form of social
preferences related to relative wealth and reciprocity.8 The nature of the social preferences
might depend on whether others payo¤s are higher than or lower than the subjects own
payo¤s, therefore Charness and Rabin vary this aspect of their items. By contrast, in SVO
the subject decides among choices where monetary payo¤s accruing to oneself are never less
than that accruing to the other subject. Also, in contrast the technique employed in Charness
and Rabin, SVO is not equipped to evaluate preferences for reciprocity.
1.3 Endogenous Social Preferences and Behavioral Spillovers
Consider the relationship between our paper and research on endogenous social preferences.
For instance, Carpenter (2005) and Canegallo et al. (2008) investigate how the strategic
8Chen and Li (2009) perform a similar type of analysis when considering the type, or identity, of the other
subject.
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environment can a¤ect preferences.9 Also, Güth et al. (2008) nd that subjects who contribute
more in a public goods game are signicantly more trusting in a subsequent investment game.
By contrast, we study whether the decision in a commonly used measure of social preferences
can a¤ect the outcome of a subsequent measure of social preferences.10 Further, as we nd a
systematic relationship, in our view the results are best described as endogenous.
There also exists a strand of literature which examines the role of the environment on play
in games. For instance, Bednar et al. (2011) describe an experiment in which subjects simul-
taneously play two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors nd that behavior
in a particular game is a¤ected by corresponding paired game.11 This literature contends that
strategies which are used in one game are often applied to the other, despite that the games
should be played independently. The authors examine these behavioral spillovers but, unlike
the present paper, they do not directly measure preferences.
Borgloh et al. (2010) is perhaps closest to our paper. The authors describe an experiment
where subjects are given an unfamiliar measure of altruism and a familiar measure, where the
authors vary the order of the measures. The authors nd evidence that the order a¤ects the
behavior in the unfamiliar task but not in the familiar task. Likewise, we vary the order of
tasks and examine the di¤erences in behavior.
1.4 Framing E¤ects
The present paper shares some similarities with the framing e¤ects literature. For instance, it
has been found that the there can be systematic di¤erences in the response to questions based
on how the questions are framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).12 Like the framing literature,
9Schotter et al. (1996) examines the e¤ect of framing on judgements of fairness and is therefore related to
endogenous preferences. Eckel and Grossman (2005) nd that a strong identity manipulation can induce more
cooperation in public goods game. Also, see Bowles (1998), Poulsen and Poulsen (2006) and Isoni et al. (2011)
for more on endogenous preferences.
10Brosig et al. (2007) examine the stability of social preferences across an extended period of time and nd
evidence of stability only among selsh subjects. Blanco et al. (2011) do not nd evidence of stability of social
preferences across simple games. In contrast, de Oliveira et al. (2008) nd evidence of consistency between
altruistic behavior in the eld and in the laboratory.
11Also see Bednar and Page (2007), Crawford and Broseta (1998), Savikhina and Sheremeta (2009) and Van
Hyuck et al. (1993).
12For more on the framing e¤ects, see Frisch (1993). For evidence that framing e¤ects can occur in subjects
where one would expect otherwise, see Gächter et al. (2009).
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the present paper appears to provide evidence against the assumptions that preferences are
stable and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner. However, unlike the framing
literature, the e¤ects which we nd persist after the initial "frame" and this persistence seems
to be based, at least in part, upon the actions of the subject. Specically, in Study 1 we
nd that prosocial subject are a¤ected by the timing and in both studies we nd that the
consistent subjects are a¤ected by the timing.
2 Study 1
2.1 Overview
We seek to test whether outcomes of a measure of social preferences can a¤ect subsequent
measurements. Therefore, we direct subjects to complete the SVO and make an allocation in
a standard dictator game, however we vary the order in which these are given to the subjects.
2.2 Procedure
A total of 95 students enrolled in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United
States participated. The study was conducted in 5 classes of 16, 20, 39, 12, and 8 subjects.13
The responses were entered on paper. The subjects were given course credit for attendance
and were told that that a randomly selected 25% from each session would be paid the amount
earned in the experiment. The subjects completed the SVO and decided on an allocation in
a standard $10 dictator game. The allocation of the $10 was presented in $0.25 increments.
The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 41 dictator game allocations they most
preferred. See Appendix 1 for the format of the dictator game.
The subjects were aware of the triadic design as they were told to make allocation decisions
involving themselves ("You") and another subject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2")
was to make allocations involving Other2 and You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each
subject was what was kept in the You-Other1 allocation decisions plus what Other2 did not
keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In both the SVO and dictator game, the status of
13We exluded a single subject because the subject did not complete the study.
8
You, Other1 and Other2 remained xed. This description of the triadic design was provided
verbally by the same male experimenter and in written form given to each subject. The
written instructions are provided in Appendix 1.14
The SVO entailed the exact nine items from Van Lange et al. (1997). The subjects were
presented with three items on each of three pages. In Van Lange et al., the subjects decide on
an allocation of points which carry no nancial implications. By contrast, in our experiment
subjects are o¤ered a conversion rate of points to money, whereby the subject is e¤ectively
deciding on an allocation of a small amount of money. Across all 9 SVO items, the subject
could keep as little as $0.94 and as much as $1.06. Also across the SVO items, the subject
could send as little as $0.19 and send as much as $0.94. The subjects were not told these
amounts, however they could be easily calculated. The SVO items and the conversion from
points to money are given in Appendix 1.
Within each of the 5 classes, approximately half of the subjects answered the SVO items
then made a choice in the dictator game. We refer to this treatment as SVO First. Approxi-
mately half of each class responded to the dictator game then answered the SVO items. We
refer to this treatment as SVO Last. Within each session, we randomly assigned subjects into
one of these two treatments.
The subjects completed the experiment without feedback. In other words, each subject
completed the experiment without knowing what the other subjects have selected. Finally,
we note that have data on the gender and age of the subjects.
2.3 Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects, which is the sum of the amount kept in the
SVO and the amount kept in the dictator game, ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average
of $7.09. The total amount accruing to the subjects, which is the sum of what was kept by
14The triadic design does not require that each session has a number of subjects which is divisible by three.
Within each session, every subject was assigned a subject identication number. After the session, we randomly
selected a number between 1 and the number of subjects in the session minus one. We then matched each
subject with an Other1 by nding the subject with an identication number which is equal to the original
identication number plus the random number. The Other2 was determined to be the subject with the next
highest identication number as the Other1. In this way, each subject could be assigned a unique Other1 and
Other2, without requiring that the data occur in multiples of three.
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the subject and what was sent by Other2, ranged from $2.51 to $21.93, with an average of
$11.69 and standard deviation of 3.56. Female participants accounted for 37% of the subjects.
The average age was 21.8 with a standard deviation of 5.56. Also note that we do not nd
signicant di¤erences in the amount kept in the dictator game or in the SVO classication
among the ve sessions.
Using the procedure of Van Lange et al. (1997), we categorized 31 subjects (33%) as
prosocials, 39 subjects (41%) as individualists and 5 subjects (5%) as competitors. There
were 20 subjects (21%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6
choices of a particular type. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to
SVO categorization and the treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 14 24 3 8 49
SVO Last 17 15 2 12 46
Total 31 39 5 20 95
Table 1: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and treatment
As one would expect, there is a signicant relationship between the SVO measure and
choice in the dictator game. The prosocial subjects (M = 4:67; SD = 1:63) kept signicantly
less than did the proself (individualists and competitors) subjects (M = 7:28; SD = 2:48),
t(73) = 5:13; p < 0:01.
An SVO measure equaling 9 indicates perfect consistency in the set of responses and a
measure of 6, 7, or 8 indicates a less than perfectly consistent set of responses. See Table 2 for
the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and consistency.15
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO of 9 4:31 7:95
(1:69) (2:12)
SVO of 6; 7; or 8 5:89 6:12
(0:45) (2:11)
15See Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Cox and Sadiraj (2011) for other papers with dictator game choices in
which some subjects kept less than 50%.
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Table 2: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and
consistency of measurement with standard deviation in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, those with a measure equal to 9 (24 subjects) kept a
signicantly smaller share than those with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(29) = 2:44, p = 0:021.
Also, among the subjects classied as individualistic, those with a measure equal to 9 (26
subjects) kept a signicantly larger share than those with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(37) = 2:55;
p < 0:001. Therefore, we are reasonably condent of the relationship between choice in the
SVO and choice in the dictator game.
We now compare dictator allocations given the treatment. First, the di¤erence between
the amount kept in the SVO First treatment (M = $6:04; SD = 2:89) and in the SVO Last
treatment (M = $6:16; SD = 2:40) is not signicant, t(94) = 0:23; p = 0:41. However, a
signicant relationship emerges when one looks within SVO classications. See Table 3 for a
summary of the amounts kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 4:14 7:38
(2:28) (2:23)
SVO Last 5:10 7:28
(0:55) (2:40)
Table 3: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and
treatment with standard deviation in parentheses
We run regressions with a dependent variable of the amount kept in the dictator game.
Since this variable is bounded, we use the tobit regressions, with an upper bound of 10 and
a lower bound of 0.16 We also employ the Prosocial Dummy which takes a value of 1 if the
subject was classied as a prosocial by SVO and 0 otherwise. We use a prosocial dummy
because subjects determined to have individualistic or competitive preferences would imply
identically selsh behavior in the dictator game.
When the analysis includes subjects of each SVO classication, the SVO treatment is not
signicantly related to the amount kept in the dictator game. As a result, we perform the
16Note that Borgloh et al. (2010) also use tobits in order to account for the bounded choice data.
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following analysis while restricting attention to a subset of the subjects. In regressions (1)
and (2) we restrict attention to the 31 subjects who are classied as prosocial. In regressions
(3) and (4) we restrict attention to the subjects with an SVO prosocial measure of 9. Fi-
nally, in regressions (5) and (6) we restrict attention to the subjects with an SVO measure
equaling 9. Note that this outcome indicates perfect consistency for prosocials, competitors
or individualists. See Table 4 for a summary of the analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SVO First  1:08  0:942  1:42  1:27  1:48  1:47
(0:613) (0:567) (0:715) (0:690) (0:869) (0:835)
Prosocial Dummy          4:79  4:69
(0:883) (0:847)
Female   1:320   1:44   1:71
(0:601) (0:720) (0:860)
Age    0:119    0:0935   0:0199
(0:0786) (0:0910) (0:0730)
Observations 31 31 24 24 53 53
Log Likelihood  58:92  56:23  45:51  43:52  106:04  103:96
Table 4: Results of tobit regressions with amount kept in the dictator game as
dependent variable. The tobit regressions were performed with an upper bound of
10 and a lower bound of 0. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, **
indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:1.
We rst note that the SVO First coe¢ cient is signicant at the 0.1 level in regressions (1),
(2), (4), (5), (6), and signicant at the 0.05 level in regression (3). The estimates in regressions
(1)-(4) suggest that the prosocial subjects who are rst given the SVO, are more generous in
the dictator game. The estimates in regressions (5) and (6) suggest that all subjects with a
perfectly consistent measure on the SVO act more generously in the dictator game.
We note that we did not list the analysis which includes the interaction between the SVO
First and Prosocial Dummy because in these specications the estimate is not signicant. We
also note interesting results related to generosity of the gender coe¢ cient. Regressions (2),
(4) and (6) suggest that within these subsets, female participants can be less generous than
male subjects. When one performs the analysis for all data points, the female coe¢ cient is no
longer signicant.
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3 Study 2
3.1 Overview
Roughly, Study 1 nds that prosocial subjects act even more prosocially in the dictator game
when the SVO items are administered rst. We also nd that subjects who are rst given the
SVO and have a perfectly consistent measure are more generous in the dictator game than are
subjects who are given the SVO last and have a perfectly consistent measure. Based on the
data available from Study 1, it is not clear to us what drives this result. As there is no choice
involving the creation of surplus in the standard dictator game, it is possible that the creation
of surplus by the prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment predisposes them to be more
generous in the dictator game when compared to prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. If
this was the case, and if the dictator game was designed so that the dictator game decided the
amount of surplus then the results in the SVO Last treatment would converge to that of the
SVO First treatment. However, it is also possible that with the standard dictator game, being
selsh is too easy and so the individualists are not a¤ected by the timing. If this is the case,
and if the dictator game is designed in a manner in which being selsh is more costly then we
expect a divergence of the results of the SVO First and Last treatments of the individualists.
In Study 2, we hope to to shed some light on the relative merit of these two explanations.
Study 2 follows the same procedure as Study 1 with the exception that, rather than using
a standard dictator game, we use a dictator game in which the relative allocation price is
1-to-3. In other words, the most selsh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most
generous allocation is $0 to self and $30 to other. This nonstandard dictator game has the
advantages that the amount of total surplus is a matter of choice and being selsh is relatively
more costly.
3.2 Procedure
A total of 90 students in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United States
participated. Study 2 was conducted in 4 classes of 21, 42, 16 and 11 subjects. The procedures
in Study 2 are identical to that in Study 1 with the exception of the form of the dictator game.
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Rather than the standard dictator game, in which the trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other
payo¤s is 1-to-1, the dictator game used in Study 2 has a trade-o¤ of 1-to-3. In other words,
to increase the amount kept by $0.50, the subjects must reduce the amount sent to the other
subject by $1.50. The subjects own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the other
subjects payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which
of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred. See Appendix 1 for the format of this
dictator game.
3.3 Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average
of $8.17. The total amount accruing to the subjects ranged from $1.13 to $42.00, with an
average of $17.36 and standard deviation of 9.23. Also note that we do not nd signicant
di¤erences in the amount kept in the dictator game or in the SVO classication among the
four sessions. Finally, we do not have data on the gender or age of a single subject. As a result,
any analysis employing these variables will contain one fewer observation than the analysis
without. Female participants accounted for 34% of the subjects. The average age was 22.4
with a standard deviation of 4.86.
Again using the procedure of Van Lange et al. (1997), we categorized 44 subjects (49%)
as prosocials, 34 subjects (38%) as individualists and 4 subjects (4%) as competitors. There
were 8 subjects (9%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices
of a particular type. Table 5 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to SVO
categorization and the treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 21 16 2 5 44
SVO Last 23 18 2 3 46
Total 44 34 4 8 90
Table 5: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and treatment
Similar to Study 1, we nd a signicant relationship between choice in the SVO and
14
choice in the dictator game. The prosocial subjects (M = 6:44; SD = 2:79) kept signicantly
less than did the proself (individualists and competitors) subjects (M = 8:28; SD = 2:33),
t(80) = 3:20; p = 0:002. As in Study 1, we nd that the consistency of the SVO is related to
the choice in the dictator game. See Table 6 for the amount kept across both treatments by
the consistency of the SVO.
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO of 9 5:97 8:38
(3:11) (2:37)
SVO of 6; 7, or 8 7:46 7:94
(1:57) (2:53)
Table 6: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and
consistency of measurement with standard deviation in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, subjects with a measure equal to 9 (30 subjects) kept
a smaller share than subjects with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(42) = 1:70; p = 0:097. However,
in contrast to Study 1, among those classied as individualistic, subjects with a measure equal
to 9 (17 subjects) did not keep a signicantly di¤erent amount than subjects with a measure
of 6, 7, or 8, t(32) = 0:52; p = 0:60.
Finally, we may ask whether the timing matters for dictator game in Study 2. See Table
7 for the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 5:98 8:00
(3:18) (2:54)
SVO Last 6:87 8:31
(2:36) (2:38)
Table 7: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and
treatment with standard deviation in parentheses
Unlike in Study 1, here we nd evidence that the order treatment is related to the amount
kept in the dictator game across all subjects in Study 2. We perform tobit regressions, similar
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to the analysis summarized in Table 4, across all subjects. Again note that the tobit regres-
sions employed an upper bound of 10 and a lower bound of 0. Regression (1) excludes the
demographic data (gender and age) and regression (2) includes these variables. This analysis
is summarized in Table 8.
(1) (2)
SVO First  1:45  1:56
(0:758) (0:757)
Prosocial Dummy  2:19  2:28
(0:761) (0:760)
Female   1:06
(0:797)
Age   0:0187
(0:0761)
Observations 90 89
Log Likelihood  201:31  198:01
Table 8: Results of tobit regressions with amount kept in the dictator game as
dependent variable. The tobit regressions were performed with an upper bound of
10 and a lower bound of 0. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, **
indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:1.
We note that the SVO First variable is signicant at 0.05 in regression (1) and signicant
at 0.01 in regression (2). This provides evidence that subjects who are rst given the SVO
measure are more generous in the dictator game than are subjects who are given the SVO
measure last. We contrast the results summarized in Table 8 with that in Study 1. In Study
1 we did not nd a relationship across all subjects between the order treatment and behavior
in the dictator game.
Next we perform a similar analysis to that summarized in Table 4, where we run tobit
regressions on subsets of the Study 2 data. Regressions (1) and (2) are restricted to subjects
who were classied as prosocial. In regressions (3) and (4) we restrict attention to subjects
with an SVO prosocial measure of 9. Finally, regressions (5) and (6) restrict attention to the
subjects with an SVO measure of 9. These results are summarized in Table 9.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SVO First  1:04  1:22  1:34  2:03  2:07  2:92
(0:999) (0:974) (1:44) (1:41) (1:10) (1:12)
Prosocial Dummy          3:84  3:89
(1:15) (1:11)
Female   1:97   2:73   1:74
(1:009) (1:49) (1:19)
Age   0:0303   0:162   0:221
(0:0815) (0:178) (0:149)
Observations 44 43 30 29 49 48
Log Likelihood  104:18  99:90  72:06  67:30  106:89  101:72
Table 9: Results of tobit regressions with amount kept in the dictator game as
dependent variable. The tobit regressions were performed with an upper bound of
10 and a lower bound of 0. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and *
indicates signicance at p < 0:1.
First, we note that the SVO First coe¢ cient is not signicant in regressions (1)-(4). This
implies that, unlike the results in Study 1, here we do not nd evidence that the order treat-
ment a¤ects behavior in the dictator game among the prosocial subjects. However, as we do in
Study 1, we nd a relationship among those with a perfectly consistent SVO measure, between
the order treatment and generosity in the dictator game. Indeed, this variable is signicant
at 0.01 in regression (6).
We note that the interaction terms between the SVO First variable and the SVO outcomes
are not signicant. We also have performed an analysis similar to that in regressions (1)-(4)
but with individualistic subjects. One might have expected the SVO First variable to be
signicant however we do not nd a signicant relationship.
4 Pooled Data
Here we analyze the pooled data obtained in Study 1 and 2. While Study 1 and Study 2 were
conducted at di¤erent times and on di¤erent subjects, their procedures are identical with the
exception of the format of the dictator game. In order to account for these di¤erences in the
dictator game, we employ the fraction of money kept in the dictator game as the dependent
variable. In each of the regressions below, we include a dummy variable, Normal Dictator
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game which obtains a value of 1 for the dictator game used in Study 1 and 0 otherwise. We
also use the interaction between the Normal Dictator variable and the SVO First variable.
In regressions (1) and (2) we perform the analysis on all of the subjects in both studies.
Regressions (3) and (4) restrict attention to the prosocial subjects in both studies. Finally,
in regressions (5) and (6) we restrict attention to subjects with a perfectly consistent SVO
measure. This analysis is summarized in Table 10.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SVO First  0:137  0:144  0:0749  0:0879  0:191  0:242
(0:0713) (0:0716) (0:0693) (0:0687) (0:0918) (0:0927)
Prosocial Dummy  0:279  0:284      0:462  0:463
(0:0515) (0:0516) (0:0667) (0:0655)
Female   0:0519   0:119   0:139
(0:0520) (0:0548) (0:0685)
Age   0:004324    0:00128   0:00707
(0:00493) (0:00514) (0:00713)
Normal Dictator  0:0164  0:0151 0:0388 0:0364 0:0273 0:00334
(0:0707) (0:0710) (0:0728) (0:0716) (0:0922) (0:0908)
Normal Dictator 0:0817 0:0867  0:0408  0:0274 0:0447 0:0902
-SVO First Interaction (0:0993) (0:0998) (0:108) (0:106) (0:128) (0:127)
Observations 185 184 75 74 102 101
Log Likelihood  95:04  94:14  11:22  9:35  48:24  45:22
Table 10: Results of tobit regressions with fraction kept in the dictator game
as dependent variable. The tobit regressions were performed with an upper bound
of 10 and a lower bound of 0. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, **
indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:1.
We note that the SVO First coe¢ cient is signicant across subjects in both studies. In
particular, the results of regressions (1) and (2) suggest that subjects who rst receive the
SVO are more generous in the dictator game than are subjects who receive the SVO last. We
also note that, when restricting attention to only prosocial subjects, the SVO First variable is
not signicant. Next we note that the SVO First variable is signicant at 0.05 in regression
(5) and signicant at 0.01 in regression (6). Finally, we note that there is not evidence of a
signicant interaction between the SVO First variable and the prosocial dummy.
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5 Discussion
In the analysis of Study 1 we found that prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment kept
signicantly less in the standard dictator game than prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. We
also found that the subjects with a perfectly consistent SVO measure were more generous than
subjects with a less than perfectly consistent measure. In the analysis of Study 2 we found
that, across all subjects, those who were given the SVO measure rst were more generous
in the dictator game. And similar to that found in the analysis of Study 1, we found that
subjects with a perfectly consistent SVO measure were a¤ected by the timing. However, we
did not nd evidence that the prosocial subjects were a¤ected by the timing. When we pool
the data, we nd evidence that subjects who were given the SVO measure rst, were more
generous in the dictator game, and that this e¤ect was stronger among those with a perfectly
consistent SVO measure.
There seem to be two e¤ects related to the timing of the measures. First, prosocial subjects
are di¤erentially a¤ected by the timing in Study 1 but not Study 2. This is consistent with
the explanation that prosocials who rst complete the SVO have their generosity made salient
by the creation of surplus. As a result, these subjects are more generous in the dictator game
than prosocials who have not yet completed the SVO. However, once both the SVO and the
dictator game contain the creation of surplus, as it does in Study 2, the e¤ect diminishes. The
second e¤ect relates to the generosity exhibited by all subjects in Study 2 who rst receive the
SVO measure, where the generosity is stronger among those with a perfectly consistent SVO
measure. This is consistent with the explanation that the measurement of SVO can prompt
subjects of all social preferences, particularly those with perfect SVO measures, to be more
generous. However, when being selsh becomes more costly, as it does in Study 2, all subjects
act more generously.
Our results could partially be explained by wealth e¤ects, whereby subjects who have
completed the SVO were a¤ected the money earned. We point out that SVO accounts for
a very small amount of money, and it seems rather implausible that a change in wealth of
$0.12 would a¤ect behavior in a $10 dictator game. Further, the wealth e¤ect argument is
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not consistent with the di¤erential e¤ects related to the measure of consistency of the SVO
measure, since this includes prosocials, individualists and competitors.
6 Concluding Comments
In this paper, we describe two studies in which we measure social preferences through choice
in the Social Value Orientation (SVO) and choice in a dictator game. In Study 1, we vary the
order of the SVO and a standard dictator game. We nd evidence that subjects with prosocial
preferences act more generously in the dictator game when the SVO items are given rst. On
the other hand, we do not nd evidence that subjects with individualistic preferences are
a¤ected by the order of the items. However, we do nd that subjects with perfectly consistent
SVO measures are a¤ected by the timing of the measurement.
To better understand these results, Study 2 performs the identical procedure of Study
1 with the exception that a nonstandard dictator game is used. This nonstandard dictator
game exhibits a 1-to-3 trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other payo¤s, whereas the standard
dictator game has a 1-to-1 trade-o¤. We nd that the timing a¤ects behavior in the dictator
game, and this e¤ect is larger for subjects with a perfectly consistent SVO measure. These
results call into question the assumptions that social preferences are stable and that they can
be measured in a reliable and nonintrusive manner.
It is worth reecting on the limitations of the present experimental design. For instance,
we cannot determine whether the SVO measurement a¤ects the dictator game choices, the
dictator game choices a¤ects the SVO measurement or perhaps both. Such questions of
endogeneity are notoriously tricky and would require further study. It is also unclear if the
timing matters in the measurement of preferences via Andreoni-Miller, Charness-Rabin, or
Chen-Li techniques. Finally, SVO only measures social preferences when the subject receives
a larger share than the other subject. The signicance of this detail is not clear. Hopefully,
future work will shed light on these issues.
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Appendix 1
We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et al., 1997) in order to measure the SVO
of the subjects. Each of the 9 items has a prosocial answer, a individualistic answer and a
competitive answer. Each item is stated in terms of points where 100 points corresponded to
$0.02103.
Question 1 A B C
You: 480 points 540 points 480 points
Other1: 80 points 280 points 480 points
Question 2 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 100 points
Question 3 A B C
You: 520 points 520 points 580 points
Other1: 520 points 120 points 320 points
Question 4 A B C
You: 500 points 560 points 490 points
Other1: 100 points 300 points 490 points
Question 5 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 490 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 90 points
Question 6 A B C
You: 500 points 500 points 570 points
Other1: 500 points 100 points 300 points
Question 7 A B C
You: 510 points 560 points 510 points
Other1: 510 points 300 points 110 points
Question 8 A B C
You: 550 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 100 points 500 points
Question 9 A B C
You: 480 points 490 points 540 points
Other1: 100 points 490 points 300 points
The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A and 9C. The prosocial
answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C and 9B. The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C,
3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B and 9A. Van Lange et al. classies a subject according to the above
labels if six or more items are answered according to the above.
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Instructions given to each subject:
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Study 1 Dictator Game:
23
Study 2 Dictator Game:
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